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THE RIGHT TO LIVE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT FOR
MANDATORY PREVENTATIVE HEALTH CARE FOR
FEMALE PRISONERS
Two diseases have claimed women's lives for years but only
within the last decade have they gained great notoriety. Pleas for
women to take steps to facilitate early detection and treatment of
the diseases - the key to survival - run rampant across television
screens, newspapers, and virtually all means of communication.
Western society has even set aside an entire month to raise
awareness of the power of one of these diseases to strike at the very
heart of womanhood. The two diseases do not discriminate in
attacking young and old, rich and poor, and free and incarcerated.
These diseases affect groups of women differently, based on
whether each group has a meaningful opportunity to combat them.
These two diseases are breast and cervical cancer.
Not surprisingly, "[bireast cancer affects more women than any
other cancer except skin cancer, and kills more than any cancer but
lung cancer."' Often a cancerous tumor grows for three to five years
before detection by a mammogram.2 The American Cancer Society
estimates that a chilling 10,520 cases of invasive cervical cancer
would be diagnosed in the United States in 2002." It is no wonder
that the message of preventative care for each of these diseases has
grown so rapidly and with such conviction.4
Preventative care and early detection take on new meaning,
however, for female prisoners. As individuals at the mercy of their
guardian, the state, female prisoners do not have access to the
multiple health care options possessed by women in mainstream
society. Consequently, it is arguable that the chances are much
higher for female prisoners to develop breast or cervical cancer that
remains undetected until late, irreparable stages.
This note will examine the extent to which access to
preventative health care in the form of yearly mammograms for
breast cancer and Pap tests for cervical cancer are more than just
measures prisons should be encouraged to use. Instead, this note
1. Elizabeth Cohen, New Treatments Hold Out Hope for Breast Cancer Patients, at
http'Jwww.cnn.com/2001/HEALTHIcancer/01/26/breast.cancerfmdex.html (last visited Oct.
18, 2002).
2. Id.
3. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CERVICALCANCER3(2004) available at http://documents.
cancer.org/115.00/115.00.pdf. (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
4. See id. at 3 (Between 1955 and 1992, the number of deaths from cervical cancer in
the United States dropped seventy-four percent, primarily due to increased use of the Pap
test which is able to detect changes in the cervix before cancer develops and early cancer).
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argues that routine access to preventative measures for female
prisoners is a constitutional right - to deny women access to such
measures is a violation of the Eighth Amendment proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment.
To understand the constitutional argument for preventative
health care for female prisoners one must first examine the origins
of the Eighth Amendment's application to prison health care. Part
I presents how the Supreme Court's historical interpretation of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has ultimately
shaped basic rights to which all prisoners are entitled. Part II
examines the Eighth Amendment's expansion and applicability to
health care for prisoners. Part III makes the case for a constitutional
right to preventative health care under the Estelle v. Gamble5
'deliberate indifference' standard.
THE HISTORY OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OF PRISONERS
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, "[elxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."6 The 'cruel
and unusual punishments' provision originated in the Virginia
constitution.7 By the time of the provision's adoption as the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1791, it had
previously been adopted in eight other state constitutions as well as
by the federal government in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.8
Prior to the provision's adoption as the Eighth Amendment,
its interpretation was discussed at length - the founding fathers
engaged in great debate to define the parameters of "cruel and
unusual punishments".9 For example, delegates to the Massachusetts
convention expressed concern about limitations on methods of
federal punishment. 10 Members of the Virginia delegation expressed
5. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
7. See Anthony F. Granucci, 'Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 841(arguing that the American framers misinterpreted the intent of the
drafters of the English Bill of Rights in which barbarous punishments that were
proportionate to the crime were legitimate).
10. The delegation's sentiment was well expressed:
[Congress will] have to ascertain, point out, and determine, what kinds of
punishments shall be inflicted on persons convicted of crimes. They are nowhere
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a similar sentiment reflected in their fear of the use of "tortures"
and "barbarous" punishments because of a lack of prohibitions on
them.11 At the time of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause's
adoption, however, it became an accepted view that the provision
prohibited the use of certain methods of punishment. 2 Despite the
accepted view, the clause permitted much room for interpretation
and was left in the hands of the Supreme Court.
Various opportunities to construe the parameters of the Eighth
Amendment have been presented before the Court. The first
noteworthy case to figure into the Court's construction of the Eighth
Amendment 'cruel and unusual punishments' clause is Wilkerson
v. Utah."3 In Wilkerson, the defendant was charged and convicted
of murder in the first degree." He was subsequently sentenced to
a public death by gunshot." On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
defendant challenged his sentence, arguing that death by gunshot
was not as a legitimate means of execution as the existing law of
the Territory only provided that a person convicted of first-degree
murder "shall suffer death,"6 The law therefore, left no specific
means by which an execution could take place. 7 Furthermore, the
existing law replaced a previous statute that explicitly stated that
if a person were to be convicted of first-degree murder he could be
executed by gunshot.'8
In response to the defendant's challenge that death by gunshot
was not within the acceptable means of punishment to be prescribed
by courts, the Supreme Court presented numerous instances in
which death by gunshot was used as the method of punishment. 9
restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments and
annexing them to crimes; and there is no constitutional check of them, but that
racks andgibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.
Id. at 841 (quoting 2 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION III (2d ed. 1881)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 842.
13. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 132.
17. Id.
18. The provision in the superseded statute read, "when any person shall be convicted
of any crime the punishment of which is death, . . . he shall suffer death by being shot, hung,
or beheaded, as the court may direct." Id. at 132.
19. The Court provided,
Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but the
authorities referred to are quite sufficient to show that the punishment of
shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of murder in
the first degree is not included in that category, within the meaning of the
eighth amendment.
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After establishing that the punishment was not cruel and unusual,
and therefore legitimate within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court justified its authority to prescribe execution
by shooting in the absence of specific statutory guidelines of the
means of carrying out executions.2 ° "It must be that the duty is
devolved upon the court authorized to pass the sentence to determine
the mode of execution and to impose the sentence prescribed."21
In hindsight, the case's outcome appears to have contributed
very little to the effort to enforce the Eighth Amendment's
condemnation of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court's
underlying reasoning, however, which rendered shooting to be less
barbaric than, for instance, burning someone alive, evinced a desire
to seek means for execution that did not involve prolonged pain or
suffering.22 Arguably, the Court was searching for humane means
to execute punishments.
In re Kemmler23 incorporated the same reasoning as used by
the Court in Wilkerson when it held that execution by electrocution
was not a cruel and unusual punishment under the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. As Chief Justice Fuller wrote in the opinion of
the Court, "[plunishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution."24 While the
Court continued to construct the parameters of cruel and unusual
punishments under the traditional view that the clause strictly
applied to the means used for executing punishment, cases such as
O'Neil v. Vermont 5 opened up the possibility for an expanded view
of the cruel and unusual clause's prohibition.'
In O'Neil, the State of Vermont charged the defendant with the
illegal sale of alcohol, convicted him on three hundred and seven
separate counts, and fined him a sum of money. When defendant
failed to pay, the court sentenced him to serve over fifty-four years
Id. at 134-35. The "authorities" that the Court refers to in Wilkerson consist primarily of
military law. Like the statute at issue, military law also did not state how a person must be
executed if it was determined that execution was the appropriate punishment. Instead, the
punishments were left entirely to the custom of war, and death by shooting was a common
means used for execution. See id.
20. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136.
21. Id. at 137.
22. See id at 135-36.
23. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
24. Id. at 447.
25. 144 U.S. 323 (1829) (Writ of error dismissed).
26. Granucci, supra note 7, at 842.
27. See O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 330.
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in prison.2" Defendant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court of
Vermont that the cruel and unusual punishment clause should
extend to punishments that are disproportionate to the crime.2 9
Although the Supreme Court dismissed the case on procedural30"
grounds, in dicta, they cited significant language from the Supreme
Court of Vermont,
The constitutional inhibition of cruel and unusual punishments,
or excessive fines or bail, has no application. If he has subjected
himself to a severe penalty, it is simply because he has
committed a great many such offences... The mere fact that
cumulative punishments may be imposed for distinct offences in
the same prosecution is not material upon this question. If the
penalty were unreasonably severe for a single offence, the
constitutional question might be urged; but here the
unreasonableness is only in the number of offences which the
respondent has committed."'
O'Neil's argument was one of the Court's first exposures to a
broader interpretation and application of the Eighth Amendment. 2
In 1909, the mere potential for a broader interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment became law in Weems v. United States.3 3 In
Weems, the petitioner was convicted of falsifying a public and
official document while serving in the capacity of disbursement
officer in the Philippine Islands.3 He was sentenced to fifteen years
in prison, civil interdiction,' surveillance during life," and perpetual,
28. See id. (The aggregate of three days of imprisonment for each dollar in default of
payment of the fine and costs in criminal cases).
29. See id. at 331.
30. See id. at 331-32 (The question was raised but not decided because it was not as a
Federal question assigned as error, and, so far as it arose under the constitution of Vermont,
it was not within the province of the court to decide).
31. State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, 165, cited in O'Neil at 144 U.S. at 331.
32. Id. at 843.
33. 217 U.S. 349 (1909).
34. Id.
35. Under Article 42 of the Spanish Penal Code, civil interdiction "shall deprive the
person punished as long as he suffers it, of the rights of parental authority, guardianship of
person ofproperty, participation in the family council, marital authority, the administration
of property, and the right to dispose of his own property by acts inter vivos." Id. at 364.
36. Under Article 43 of the Spanish Penal Code, the responsibilities of a prisoner who is
subjected to surveillance of authorities is as follows:
1) That the fidng his domicil and giving notice thereof to the authority
immediately in charge of his surveillance, not being allowed to change it
without the knowledge and permission of said authority in writing.
2) To observe the rules of inspection prescribed.
3) To adopt some trade, art, industry, or profession, should he not have
20041 347
348 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:343
absolute disqualification from activities such as deprivation of
office, the right to vote or be elected into office, eligibility to acquire
honors, and the loss of retirement pay."7 Among other objections to
his sentence, Weems argued for assignment of error to the sentence
because the punishment was excessive in relation to the crime,
thereby constituting cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by
the Eight Amendment."8
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna addressed the question
of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and noted that
the question had not yet been decided with any level of precision. 9
By some definitions, he wrote, cruel and unusual punishment
could imply "something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the
like."40 Some courts measured the boundaries of cruel and unusual
punishment by referring to the punishments inflicted by English
monarchs.4 1 In one particular circumstance, as Justice McKenna
noted, a court even conceded the possibility that a sentence so
disproportionate to the crime could constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.
4 2
Ultimately, his reasoning supported resistance to a narrow
construction of the cruel and unusual clause's application. 3
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth .... They
are not emphemeral enactments, designed to meet passing
occasions .... The future is in their care and provision for events
of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what has been but of what may be."
known means of subsistence of his own.
Id. at 364.
37. Id. at 364-65.
38. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362-63.
39. Id. at 368.
40. Id. (citing McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 328 (1898)).
41. Id.
42. Id.(citing McDonald, 173 Mass. at 328).
43. Id. at 373 ("Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined
to the form that evil had theretofore taken").
44. Weems, 217 U.S. at 379.
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The Court held in favor of defendant Weems and reversed his
conviction because a disproportionate sentence could constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.45
The Weems holding paved a very important path for the
protection that the 'cruel and unusual punishments' clause could
potentially provide. The expansion continued in Trop v. Dulles."
Upon conviction by court martial for wartime desertion, the petitioner
was forced to forfeit his United States citizenship thereby rendering
him stateless. 7 In the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of
denationalization as a punishment, the Court further developed its
approach to interpreting the Eighth Amendment:
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. If the word 'unusual' is to
have any meaning apart from the word 'cruel,' however, the
meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something
different from that which is generally done. Denationalization
as a punishment certainly meets this test.
48
Thus, the Court's holding,
There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's
status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the
political existence that was centuries in the development .... In
short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights...
initiated an impact-based measure of what can constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. In drawing the conclusion that the
45. Id. at 380-81. In addition to the discussion on condemning narrow interpretations of
constitutional provisions, Justice McKenna also made comparisons of sentencing guidelines
that were less severe for crimes that were arguably more atrocious than the crime at issue
in the case. See id. at 380. With the comparison, he condemned Weems' sentence as exhibiting
"a difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of
constitutional limitations formed to establish justice." Accordingly, when a sentence is
imposed that establishes justice and is within constitutional limitations, "[t]he purpose of
punishment is fulfilled [because] crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting,
severity, its repetitions is prevented, and hope is given for the reformation of the criminal."
Id. at 381.
46. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
47. Id. at 87-89.
48. Id. at 101.
49. Id. at 101-02.
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Constitution does not permit Congress to punish using
denationalization, the Court reversed the imposed denationalization
sentence. 5°
Wilkerson, Kemmler, Weems, and Trop all illustrate the potential
for a broad interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment. At the time that the Court handed
down the Trops decision, however, the case law only considered the
application of the Eighth Amendment to treatment of prisoners in
the context of punishment. Society had not yet acknowledged the
possibility that poor treatment within prison facilities also could be
considered 'cruel and unusual punishment.'
PRISONERS' RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
Pre-Estelle v. Gamble
Prior to the 1970s, many assumed that the state adequately
provided for prisoners' basic material needs.5 However, in the 1970s,
documentation emerged that greatly challenged this assumption.52
General living conditions were undesirable, to say the least.'
The basic structure of the buildings was hazardous due to old age,
poor design, and, in some cases, disrepair.5 ' Correctional facilities
often maintained inadequate lighting, heating, and ventilation.55
Little, if any opportunity was provided for sufficient exercise or
other recreational activity. 8 One of the greatest threats to the
prisoners' well-being, however, came from unsanitary conditions
and practices.5 7 For instance, correctional facility dining areas and
kitchens were reportedly infested with cockroaches or contaminated
50. Id. at 103-04.
51. See B. JAYEANNO, U.S. DEPT. OFJUSTICE, CORRECTIONALHEALTH CARE: GuIDEINES
FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF AN ADEQUATE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2001) available at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/2001/017521.htm (last modified Oct. 9,2002.) "Now it is true that
the prisoner's basic material needs are met - in the sense that he does not go hungry, cold
or wet. He receives adequate medical care and he has the opportunity for exercise." Id. at 9
(quoting GRESHAM SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES (1958). It can be inferred that the
statement by Sykes articulated an assumption held by society when taking into account the
push for improvements in the treatment of prisoners in the decades to come.)
52. Id.
53. See id. at 13.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 14.
57. See id. at 13.
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by rat droppings.M Facilities demonstrated insufficient management
of food services - improper handling of food, unsanitary equipment
and utensils, unclean refrigerators, and improperly maintained
equipment.5 9 Furthermore, institutions did not have formally
established inspection guidelines to monitor the cleanliness of
facilities .60
The courts' earlier approach to these issues only exacerbated an
already tragic situation. Essentially, the court system did not
interfere with the treatment of prisoners, but rather justified its
continued inaction on several grounds. 1 First, courts refrained from
interfering with correctional facilities' treatment of prisoners based
on an attitudinal distinction between rights and privileges.62 Taking
the approach that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
'cruel and unusual punishments' was the only protection expressly
guaranteed to prisoners by the Constitution, courts viewed any
other interference in correctional administration as unwarranted
and beyond judicial authority.'
A second reason that courts refrained from interfering in the
treatment of prisoners was grounded in ignorance. Courts, lacking
expertise in correctional facilities management, deferred to the
judgment of facility officials concerning the treatment of inmates."
The result was an unchecked system of management that left an
already helpless group of individuals with little, if any, recourse for
inhumane conditions and treatment. The court's deferential approach
permitted the operation of inadequate prison health care systems.
As organizations gained interest in the conditions in
correctional facilities, they brought the inadequacy of the prison
medical services to light.65 For example, a survey conducted by the
American Medical Association in the 1970s revealed information
58. See id.
59. See id. at 14.
60. See id. at 13.
61. See id. at 15.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 12.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id. at 12.
351
352 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:343
concerning medical treatment availability in various jails.66 For
some jails, first aid was the only available medical treatment. 7
Otherj ails lacked even first aid provisions.68 According to the study,
"[n]o physician was available on a regularly scheduled basis in 28
percent of the jails studied and physicians were not available even
in an "on-call" basis in 11.4 percent of the jails."69 Despite the
distinction between prisoners and jails and due to the unavailability
of information from any national surveys conducted of prisons,
inferences were drawn based on court cases and other studies
indicating that prisons were facing the same medical services
availability issues as jails.7 °
The lack of availability of medical services was only half of
the health care problem faced by prisons. In circumstances where
prisons had available medical services, uncertainty remained
concerning the adequacy and quality of the health care provided.
For example, very few jails provided physical examinations for all
inmates.71 In most instances where examinations were provided,
the examinations were given only when inmates complained. 7 The
health staff in prisons frequently consisted of unlicenced health
care providers, including foreign medical graduates and untrained
'nurses.'73 Dental care was not geared towards preventative or
66. Id. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS - A 1972
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SURVEY 1-2 (1973)) [hereinafter MEDICAL CARE IN U.S.
JAILS]. A distinction exists between prisons and jails - the AMA survey reflects responses
from jails. Id. at 10. "A prison is usually defined as an individual facility operated by a unit
of state (or federal) government for the confinement of adults convicted of a felony whose
sentences exceed [one] year." Id. Jails, on the other hand "[are] generally operated by a city
or county for the purpose of holding arrestees pretrial or confining individuals convicted of
misdemeanors who generally are sentenced to I year or less." Id.
67. Id. (citing MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS, supra note 66, at 12) (65.5 percent of
responding jails only had first aid available).
68. Id. (citing MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS, supra note 66, at 12) (16.7 percent of
responding jails did not even have first aid facilities available).
69. Id. (citing MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS, supra note 66, at 20).
70. Id. at 12.
71. Id. at 13 (citing MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS, supra note 66, at 26) (In 1972, only
seven percent of jails routinely provided physical exams for all inmates).
72. ANNO, supra note 51, at 12 (citing MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. JAILS, supra note 66, at 26).
Unfortunately, no comparable national surveys identified the level and extent
of health care services in state correctional systems.... The evidence from the
few studies of state prison health care delivery ... or from court cases of that
era... indicates that, contrary to popular opinion, health care systems in
prisons were no better than those in jails.
Id. Because of this similarity, the jail data can still be construed as relatively representative
of what was occurring in prisons.
73. Id. at 12.
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restorative care but rather to an emergency services basis, which
was likely well below the standard of quality dental care. 4
For the sake of prisoners' well-being, correctional facilities were
in dire need of regulatory measures to establish a standard of
treatment for prisoners. These measures needed to guarantee the
prisoners a right to a baseline standard of health care rather than
service provisions founded on the arbitrary determinations of
correctional authorities. The Supreme Court heeded this need in
Estelle v. Gamble. 5
Estelle v. Gamble and Prisoners' Right to Health Care
By the late 1970s, the outcry for a formal statement about
prisoners' health care needs was at its peak. Ultimately, Estelle v.
Gamble76 made one of the boldest statements of the era regarding
prison health care.
In Estelle, respondent J.W. Gamble filed a pro se complaint
against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the prison's
failure to provide adequate medical care, thereby subjecting him
to 'cruel and unusual punishment' in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.7" Gamble's complaint began with an injury he
sustained while performing a prison work assignment.7" Although
he attempted to work after sustaining the injury, working only
aggravated it and he was permitted to go to the unit hospital.79 The
medical assistant checked Gamble for a hernia and sent him back
to the facility only for Gamble to return to the hospital with intense
pain." A doctor later diagnosed Gamble's injury as a lower back
strain, prescribed medication, and retained "cell-pass, cell-feed"
status for a period of time.8' Gamble continued to see the doctor on
several occasions until one visit, when despite his complaints that
his back had not improved, the doctor removed Gamble from "cell-
pass, cell-feed" status and certified him for light work.82
74. Id. at 13 (citing e.g.,McmGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, KEY TO HEALTH OF A
PADLOCKED SOCIETY, LANSING: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRErIONS 226 (1975)).
75. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
76. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
77. See id. at 98.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 100.
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Shortly thereafter, Gamble's back pain and other ailments
required him to see yet another doctor.8 Although the doctor
prescribed medication for Gamble, he did not immediately receive
it because prison staff lost the prescription. 4 During the ordeal,
officials pressured Gamble to return to work, despite his ongoing
pain. 5 For several months, his continuing medical difficulties,
including chest pains and irregular cardiac rhythm, resulted in
additional hospitalization and medication. 6 Ultimately, prison
officials' refused to honor Gamble's requests to see a doctor for two
days when he experienced chest pains became the impetus for the
filing of his complaint.87
The Court began the analysis of Gamble's complaint by
affirming once again that the Eighth Amendment proscribes more
than physically barbarous punishments." Additionally, the Court
stated that "[tihe [Eighth] Amendment embodies 'broad and
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency...,' against which we must evaluate penal measures.8 9
Within these idealistic concepts, the Court established the
government's obligation to provide medical care for those individuals
who are incarcerated and have no other means to supply medical
care for themselves.'0 After all, "[iut is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the
deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." 1
Following the reasoning discussed supra, the Court held that
the denial of medical care when shown as "deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain,' . . . proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment." 2 The Court further stated that "indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's
needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment once prescribed." 3 The Court dismissed Gamble's
complaint, characterizing the physician's actions in Estelle as "a
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 101.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id at 102.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 104.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 104-05 (emphasis added).
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classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical
decision not to order an x-ray, or like measures, does not represent
cruel and unusual punishment. At most it is medical malpractice".94
Arguably since Estelle, the deliberate indifference standard
has left opportunity to expand the application of the Eighth
Amendment.9" This opportunity for expansion is relevant to the
argument for mandatory preventative health care for female
prisoners. In constructing an argument for preventative care,
the components of the deliberate indifference standard will be
analyzed separately: what constitutes 'indifference,' and what
constitutes 'deliberate.'
Three fundamental categories of 'indifference' have emerged for
which the standard of liability under the Eighth Amendment requires
resources to protect prisoners' rights.9" The categories include 1)
denial or unreasonable delay in access to a physician for diagnosis
and treatment,97 2) failure to administer treatment prescribed by a
physician,98 and 3) the denial of professional medical judgment. 9
The intent or 'deliberate' component of 'deliberate indifference'
is integral to applying the standard. "It is not enough that the
defendant should have known or ought to have understood the
danger to the inmate.""° Instead, the defendant must have
knowledge of the substantial risk to the prisoner and disregard the
risk despite the knowledge.' 0 ' In some instances, an argument
94. Id. at 107.
95. See ANNO, supra note 51, at 46.
96. Id.
The right to access to care includes access to both emergency and routine care.
Institutions of all sizes must have the capacity to cope with emergencies and
provide for sick call. Access to specialists and inpatient hospital treatment,
where warranted by the patient's condition, also are guaranteed by the eighth
amendment. Access to care must be provided for any condition (medical, dental,
or psychological) if denial of care may result in pain, continued suffering,
deterioration, less likelihood of a favorable outcome, or degeneration.
Id. at 47.
97. Id. at 47
98. See id. ("[OInce a health care professional orders treatment for a serious condition,
the courts will protect, as a matter of constitutional law, the patient's right to receive that
treatment without undue delay").
99. Id. ("Under Estelle v. Gamble, the actual decisions of prison medical personnel are
at issue only when they are not medical in nature or are so extreme or abusive that they are
completely outside the range of professional medical judgment").
100. Id.
101. Id. at 47. (This standard was put forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994),
in which a transsexual prisoner sued prison officials because they placed him in the general
prison population despite possessing an awareness of his circumstances. According to
petitioner, by placing him in the general population, the prison officials failed to keep him
from the harm inflicted by other inmates).
356 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 10:343
exists that knowledge can be inferred because the obviousness
of the risk is such that a person cannot reasonably deny knowledge
of the situation."2 Such a situation, therefore, could constitute
deliberate indifference in violation of the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment in a health care context.
In applying this analysis of the deliberate indifference standard
to mandatory preventative health care for female prisoners, an
argument arises that female prisoners could have a legitimate
constitutional right to preventative health care. First, the risk of
not providing preventative health care is obvious due to widespread
public awareness of the need for early detection. The extent of
prison officials' interactions with female prisoners are such that
knowledge can be inferred. Consequently, the 'deliberate' component
of the standard can be satisfied. Second, the very nature of breast
and cervical cancer requires early detection to provide a viable
chance for survival.' 3 When symptoms of each disease become
apparent, each disease has likely progressed to a relatively difficult
stage for successful treatment. 0 4 Consequently, the failure to
provide preventative health care falls into one of the three major
categories of 'indifference'- unreasonable delay in medical diagnosis.
MAKING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ARGUMENT FOR PREVENTATIVE
HEALTH CARE
Three Faces of Knowledge through Inference: Satisfying
'Deliberate' in 'Deliberate Indifference'
Because intent can be demonstrated through an inference of
knowledge based on the obviousness of the risk, the following
section examines three points that support the argument that the
danger of failing to provide routine preventative health care to
female prisoners is so obvious to prison officials that one can infer
knowledge of this risk. Accordingly, the inference of knowledge
102. Id. at 47.
103. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCERSOCIrTY, CERVICALCANCER, supra note 3, at 4 ("Cervical
cancer can be prevented, detected and treated successfully. If all women who are age 18 and
over, or are sexually active had a Pap test on a regular basis, the survival rate for cervical
cancer would be better than 90%").
104. See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, BREAST CANCER 1, available at http://www.cancer.
org/downloads/PRO/BreastCancer.pdf(last accessed Feb. 8,2004)("Early detection of malignant
tumors, preferably before symptoms are present, is very important because the cancer can
spread if not treated at its earliest stages").
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provides the requisite intent and therefore satisfies the first
component to the deliberate indifference standard.
First, the presence of the standards of health services
accreditation process and the suggested standards provided by the
accrediting institutions illustrate that prison officials are at least
exposed to the health care needs of female prisoners that are
considered 'essential.'1 5 Recognition of these needs arguably leads
to a basic understanding of the seriousness of breast and cervical
cancer and the need to monitor for each of these diseases.
Second, the medical status of many female prisoners when they
enter prison and the process for assessing this status before
physically incarcerating prisoners suggests that duly trained
doctors or treating personnel, once again, are exposed to the need
for preventative care. Therefore, their awareness of the obviousness
of the risk of a lack of continuing preventative care can be inferred.
Finally, because prisons provide OB/GYN services to pregnant
inmates, it is arguable that those attending to these needs are
aware of the risks of failure to appropriately monitor for reproductive
health issues. Again, it appears easy to draw the inference of
knowledge of the obviousness of the risk in the failure to provide
preventative health care to female prisoners. Collectively, as will be
discussed below, the three points provide grounds for satisfying the
'deliberate' component of the deliberate indifference standard to
show that lack of preventative health care constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.
The Inference of Knowledge of an Obvious Risk through the
Accreditation Process
Due to a desire to establish consistent, quality health services,
various organizations now provide nationally-recognized standards
for health care in prisons. In an attempt to encourage compliance
with these standards, organizations such as the National Commission
on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) may incorporate the standards
into an accreditation process for correctional facilities.'0°
Since the 1970s, the NCCHC has served as a source of
accreditation for correctional facilities that satisfy the Commission's
Standards for Health Services.0 7 The various areas covered by the
105. See discussion infra.
106. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, ACCREDITATION, at httpJ/
www.ncchc.org/accred/index.html(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
107. Id. The NCCHC is a private, not-for-profit organization whose voluntary accreditation
program is "well-known and well-respected." Id.
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Standards include "Facility governance and administration[,
mlaintaining a safe and healthy environment[, plersonnel and
training[, h] ealth care services support [, inmate care and treatment[,
hlealth promotion and disease prevention[, sipecial inmate needs
and services[, hiealth records[, and miedical legal issues.1 08
The NCCHC accreditation process involves several steps. First,
the facility must submit an application to which the NCCHC will
respond with a self-survey questionnaire."t° Once the facility
completes and returns the questionnaire, the NCCHC staff uses the
information to prepare for an on-site survey of the facility."' The
on-site survey includes an assessment of policies and procedures;
interviews with health staff, officers, detainees; and a tour of the
facility."' The NCCHC staff determines whether to grant
accreditation to the facility based on all of the information gathered
during the assessment period.112
According to the NCCHC, accreditation has its benefits:
It promotes and documents an efficient and well-managed
health care delivery system. It adds to the prestige of the
facility, increases staff morale, aids recruiting efforts, helps to
obtain community support and provides additional justification
for budgetary requests. Accreditation also can help protect a
facility's assets by minimizing the occurrence of adverse events.
... Accreditation benefits the health of the public, staff and
inmates by assuring that those incarcerated and released
receive adequate and appropriate health care according to
nationally accepted standards.1 '
Standards for women's health issues are not always articulated
clearly in the accreditation process. 14 However, the NCCHC has
108. Id.
109. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, ACCREDITATION
PROCESS, at http'/www.ncchc.org/accred/process.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
NCCHC, ACCREDITATION PROCESS]; NATIONAL COMMISSIONON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE,
APPLICATION AND CONTRACT FOR ACCREDITATION OF CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES
PROGRAMS, at httpJ/www.ncchc.org/accred/AccredApp2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
110. NCCHC, ACCREDITATION PROCESS, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. In its Position Statement, the NCCHC acknowledges that issues in women's health
care have changed to warrant the need for addendum standards or guidance to the current
standards. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, POSITION
STATEMENTS:WOMEN's HEALTH CARE IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS, at
http://www.ncchc.org/resources/statements/womenshealth.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004)
[hereinafter NCCHC, WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE].
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issued a position statement on women's health care issues for
prisons to consider when constructing their health care standards. 115
The relevant portion of the Position Statement reads:
The National Commission on Correctional Health Care
recognizes that the number of female inmates is large and is
growing annually, and present unique and increasing health
problems for correctional facilities. Therefore, the Commission
recommends the following: .... Comprehensive services for
women's unique health problems should be provided in prisons,
jails, and juvenile detention and confinement facilities...
.Considering the special reproductive health needs of women,
the frequency of repeating certain tests, exams and procedures
(e.g. Pap smears, mammograms. etc.) should be based on
guidelines established by professional groups such as the
American Cancer Society, and the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and should take into account
age and risk factors of the female correctional population.
116
The reputation of the NCCHC" 7 and the integral role that the
NCCHC's suggested standards play in the structuring of many
prison health care standards and policies permits the reasonable
presumption that prisons are aware of the underlying rationale that
fuels the promulgation of various accreditation standards. This
reasoning arguably transfers to preventative health care, (i.e.
mammograms and pap smears) for female prisoners. Because many
prisons look to the NCCHC for guidance and approval on
establishing standards, it logically follows that prisons should also
acknowledge the seriousness of breast and cervical cancer and the
consequences of late detection, given the NCCHC's published
opinion on preventative care for female prisoners, which includes
justification for its reasoning. The risk of failure to detect,
therefore, becomes so obvious that one can infer that prison officials
have knowledge of the situation they potentially create by failing to
provide routine preventative care to female prisoners. Accordingly,
the accreditation process yields support for satisfying the 'deliberate'
115. "NCCHC has adopted the following position statement that, along with the published
standards, may assist correctional facilities in designing their own procedures on this
matter." Id.
116. Id. (citing ANNO, supra note 51).
117. "With more than four hundred and fifty institutions of all shapes and sizes accredited
by NCCHC, this voluntary program is wellknown and wellrespected among the nation's
prisons,jails andjuvenile detention facilities." NCCHC,ACcREDITATION PROCESS, supra note
109.
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component of the deliberate indifference standard as applied to
failure to provide female prisoners' preventative health care.
The Inference of Knowledge of an Obvious Risk Based on the
Status of Female Prisoners upon Entry
The number of women who have become a part of the prison
system drastically increased during the 1980s and 1990s."' Often
these women are poor and uneducated." 9 The indigence of many of
these women indicates that they are uninsured or underinsured. 20
Therefore, the risk of a prisoner having poor health care habits is
higher due to the limited or lack of access to health care prior to
incarceration. 121 Many women offenders will enter prisons either
pregnant 122 or carrying a sexually transmitted disease. " For female
prisoners, the poor status of their health prior to incarceration can
arguably have a substantial effect on their physical status in prison,
i.e., greater susceptibility to diseases with questionable hope of
successful treatment.
Unfortunately, even though prison officials are consistently faced
with this prototypical female prisoner, research, though limited, has
indicated that gynecological services for women in prisons has been
insufficient. 124 Prisons do not perform routine gynecological exams,
nor do they in every instance provide the exams on admission.' 25
Some prisons may not ask the appropriate initial screening
questions. 126 Furthermore, many prisons do not have physicians
trained in obstetrics and gynecology. 127 "As a result women in prison
are at risk for the lack of detection of some diseases such as breast
cancer, ovarian cancer, and abnormal pap smears. " "
'Obviousness of the risk' under these circumstances arises
simply because prison officials continually see women with similar
health backgrounds, regardless of a facility's capacity to handle
their needs. Prison officials, therefore, would presumably have
familiarity with the possible health issues surrounding female
118. See ANNO, supra note 51, at 233.
119. Id.
120. See Ellen M. Barry, Bad Medicine: Health Care Inadequacies in Women's Prisons, 16
CRIM. JuST. 39, 40 (2001).
121. Id. at 40.
122. See NCCHC, WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE, supra note 114.
123. See ANNO, supra note 51, at 234.
124. See NCCHC, WOMEN'S HEALTH CARE, supra note 114.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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prisoners' physical condition due to this continuous exposure.
Hence, the possibility of female prisoners' suffering from gender
specific diseases fails to be a secret, even if prison officials lack
specialized OB/GYN training. Furthermore, coupled with what is
arguably becoming increasingly common knowledge that cancers
such as breast and cervical cancer carry a death sentence if not
detected early enough to be successfully treated, one would be hard
pressed to argue lack of knowledge of the risk of failing to provide
preventative care to detect these diseases. Consequently, the
inference of knowledge, due to the obviousness of the risk of not
providing preventative care, is present through simple, consistent
exposure to female prisoners with similar backgrounds as they
enter the correctional facilities. Support, therefore, exists once
again for satisfying the 'deliberate' component of the 'deliberate
indifference' standard as applied to the argument for mandatory
preventative health care for female prisoners.
The Inference of Knowledge of an Obvious Risk Based on Care
Provided to Pregnant Inmates
In Pregnant Inmates' Right to Health Care, Mary Catherine
McGurrin discusses some of the medical conditions that could
warrant attention during pregnancy, thereby exposing treating
officials to the complexities of a woman's body.129 Furthermore, the
article discusses compilations of standards and guidelines that
various organizations have put forth to treat pregnant inmates. 30
Groups such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have published guidelines
for appropriate prenatal care and medical services. l3 ' After all,
"unique health needs are associated with the female reproductive
system[, and thus penal institutions] ... must provide for their
special health needs."3 2
Certain penal institutions, such as the Federal Correctional
Institution at Kentucky, have heeded the need to address the special
needs of pregnant inmates through its design of a prenatal care
129. Id. at 17779 (Complications can include development of various infections such as
hepatitis. Other medical conditions include, but are not limited to preeclampsia or acute
hypertension of pregnancy (toxemia)).
130. See id. at 18194.
131. See id. (citing AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS & AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, GUIDELINES FOR PRENATAL CARE (Frederic Frigoletto
et al. eds) (2d ed. 1988)).
132. Id. at 179 (quoting ANNO, supra note 51, at 143).
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program.' Under the system, "inmates at all security levels are
guaranteed access to obstetric and gynecological care" within the
federal correctional institution.'3 4
In dealing with pregnant inmates, whether or not a formal
system of treatment exists, one can assume that prison officials
have at least a basic level of knowledge, based on their involvement
in monitoring these inmates. First, individuals come into firsthand
contact with the unique nature of women's health care, in particular,
reproductive health care needs, as they monitor inmate pregnancies.
Therefore, prison officials have at least a basic understanding of
what is required to maintain a relatively healthful status for a
woman's body. This direct exposure to pregnant female inmates
renders obvious the risk created by the lack of preventative care.
Furthermore, it provides yet another means of support for satisfying
the "deliberate" component of the "deliberate indifference" standard.
Satisfying 'Indifference' in 'Deliberate Indifference. Unreasonable
Delay in Medical Diagnosis Through the Failure to Monitor
Possible Cancer Development
As discussed supra, indifference in the 'deliberate indifference'
standard falls into three general categories. The constitutional
argument for the provision of preventative health care to female
inmates falls into the third category - unreasonable delay of medical
diagnosis. Failure to provide preventative care for detection is
unreasonable and promotes delay because fundamentally, breast
and cervical cancers develop over time and neither are easily
detected in their initial, curable stages without monitoring.'3 The
following section further discusses the nature of each cancer
thereby better illustrating why the failure to monitor for these
diseases is to unreasonably delay medical diagnosis.
Breast Cancer
In general, cancers are defined as "a group of diseases that
cause cells in the body to change and grow out of control" with most
133. Id. at 182.
134. Id. at 182-83 (citing Anita G. Huft, et al., Care of the Pregnant Offender, 3 FED. PRISONS
J. 49, 49 (1992).
135. See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, BREAST CANCER, supra note 104, at 1; AMERICAN
CANCER SOCIETY, CERVICAL CANCER, supra note 3, at 4.
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types forming a tumor, that is, a lump or mass."3 6 Generally, the
cancer is named after the part of the body from which the tumor
initially originates. 1
37
"Breast cancer begins in breast tissue, which is made up of
glands for milk production, lobules, and the ducts that connect
lobules to the nipple. The remainder of the breast is made up of
fatty, connective and lymphatic tissue.""3 Cancerous breast tumors
come in two general forms: in situ and invasive or infiltrating.
139
Cancerous tumors that are in situ are named so because they are
confined to either the ducts or the lobules. " Invasive or infiltrating
tumors by contrast have "broken through the duct or gland walls
and have begun to invade the surrounding fatty tissue.""' The
seriousness of the invasive cancer is determined by how far the
tumor has spread at the time of the initial diagnosis.
42
Treatment options for breast cancer varies."43 For example,
cancer patients may choose to undergo surgery in the form of a
lumpectomy or mastectomy.1" A lumpectomy requires the removal
of the cancerous tissue as well as a rim of the normal tissue.145
Generally, the procedure is followed by six to seven weeks of radiation
therapy.'" For those patients opting to undergo a mastectomy, the
surgery includes the removal of the entire breast.17 Often when the
cancer is not removed by surgery, patients may choose to attack the
cancer through systematic therapies, such as, chemotherapy,
radiation therapy, or hormone therapy."48
One of the most effective ways of fighting breast cancer is
through preventative care, and mammography is the leading means
by which to detect breast cancer. 149 "Mammography is a lowdose
xray procedure that allows visualization of the internal structure of
the breast."5 ° The procedure is highly accurate with a detection
136. AMERICAN CANCER SocwY, BREAsr CANCER FAcTs & FIGURES 2003-2004 1, at
httpJ/www.cancer.org/downloadSIT/CAFF2003BrFPWSecured.pdf(last visited Feb. 8,2004).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. ([Local stage describes cancers confined to the breast; regional stage tumors have
spread to the lymph nodes; distant state cancers have metastasized (spread to distant sites")).
143. See id. at 1215.
144. Id. at 1314.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 14.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1415.
149. See id. at 12.
150. Id.
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rate of about ninety percent in asymptomatic women.' 5' Accordingly,
"[miammography is the best method available for diagnosing
breast cancer at a stage when it can be most effectively treated,
since it can identify cancer several years before physical symptoms
develop."'52 Early detection not only improves treatment options,
but it improves the success of the treatment, as well as chances
for survival." 3
The circumstances under which early detection is encouraged
do not change just because a female is in prison. Without regular
mammograms, the strong possibility exists of missing a diagnosis
of treatable breast cancer prior to development of symptoms at later
stages of the disease. Accordingly, there is an increased likelihood
that harsher, more drastic means to address the illness will be less
effective in sustaining a meaningful rate of survival. Therefore,
because breast cancer is symptom free in the early stages and the
cancer develops and manifests over many years, failure to provide
mammograms is to delay medical diagnosis of breast cancer and
essentially, increase the chances of sentencing inmates to death.
Cervical Cancer
Cervical cancer begins in the lining of the cervix, which is the
area of the body that connects the body of the uterus to the
vagina.' Cervical cancers do not form rapidly but rather, the normal
cervical cells develop precancerous changes and "some women with
precancerous changes of the cervix will develop cancer. This process
usually takes several years but sometimes can happen in less than
a year."'55 Like breast cancer, several options for treatment exist for
cervical cancer but depend on the stage of the cancer. 5 " The three
main options generally include surgery, which can range from
removal only of cancerous cells or complete removal of the uterus
(hysterectomy), radiation therapy, and/or chemotherapy.'57
According to the American Cancer Society, the number of
deaths caused by cervical cancer in the United States has declined
151. Id
152. Id. (emphasis added). Mammography is so effective and so important to use because
"[e]arly cancer, when it is most treatable, typically does not produce any symptoms." Id.
153. See id.
154. See AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, CERVICAL CANCER, supra note 3, at 1.
155. Id. at 2. ("Some women with precancerous changes of the cervix will develop cancer.
This process usually takes several years but sometimes can happen in less than a year").
156. See id. at 1624
157. Id. at 1619.
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by seventy-four percent between 1955 and 1992.11 The decrease in
the number of deaths is attributed to the increased use of the Pap
test, a screening procedure designed to diagnose precancerous
changes and early invasive cancer." 9 With regular Pap tests comes
the possibility of detecting precancerous cells to destroy them and
prevent true cancers from forming." Without Pap tests there is the
strong likelihood of meeting the same fate faced by women in many
developing countries who do not receive routine Pap tests - leading
to a diagnosis of the cervical cancer at an invasive, late, and often
deadly stage.1
6 1
Applying the previous discussion to the circumstances of female
prisoners, the nature of cervical cancer and the possible consequences
of failing to provide Pap tests support the argument that failing
to provide a means to monitor the possible formation of this
condition is unreasonable delay in providing medical diagnosis. Thus,
the unreasonable delay in medical diagnosis because of the failure
to provide preventative care to detect cervical cancerjoins in addition
to the failure to provide preventative care to detect breast
cancer, satisfies the "indifference" component of the deliberate
indifference standard.
CONCLUSION
For a prisoner to invoke the protection of Estelle v. Gamble
against cruel and unusual punishment inflicted by poor medical
judgment and care of treating physicians or other personnel, the
prisoner must show that the actions or decisions constituted
deliberate indifference towards the prisoners' need for health care.
As this note has attempted to illustrate, failure to provide
preventative care to female prisoners satisfies the deliberate
indifference standard. Coupled with the increasing public awareness
of the dangers posed by breast cancer and cervical cancer, direct
interaction with female prisoners in various medical capacities
provides a strong argument that the risks of not providing
preventative care is obvious to prison officials. The obviousness
permits an inference of knowledge of a risk and therefore, satisfies
the requisite intent.
The argument satisfies the proof of indifference because of the
nature of breast and cervical cancer's development. In most cases,
158. Id. at 3.
159. See id. at 810.
160. See id. at 12.
161. See id.
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symptoms of both diseases become apparent only in later stages,
therefore, treatment dispensed only after an inmate patient displays
symptoms, drastically decreases the chances of successful treatment
and survival. Consequently, it would be an unreasonable delay of
a medical diagnosis to fail to provide preventative health care
because delaying monitoring may yield unfortunate consequences.
The feasibility of complying with this 'constitutional right' to
preventative care health care remains a separate issue primarily
grounded in the availability of funding from already tight budgets:
the cost of equipment and qualified personnel to perform the
various monitoring tests may be prohibitive and the fear of waste
should prisoners opt not take advantage of the services.
Financial concerns, however, do not erode the fundamental
underlying principles for providing care. With the opportunity for
care, female prisoners stand the chance of serving only the court
appointed time in prison. Denying the opportunity for care, female
prisoners face the possibility of, for example, a twoyear sentence
converting to a formerly preventable death penalty. Consequently,
preventative health care for female prisoners should be at the very
least a constitutional right. Ideally, preventative health care should
be embedded in female prisoners' right to maintain their existence
as women, free of unnecessary pain and suffering beyond the scope
of their punishment.
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